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Abstract
The pricing problem in a multi-period setting is a challenging problem and has at-
tracted much attention in recent years. In this thesis, we consider a monopoly and an
oligopoly pricing problem. In the latter, several sellers simultaneously seek an optimal
pricing policy for their products. The products are assumed to be differentiated and
substitutable. Each seller has the option to set prices for her products at each time
period, and her goal is to find a pricing policy that will yield the maximum overall
profit. Each seller has a fixed initial inventory of each product to be allocated over
the entire time horizon and does not have the option to produce additional inventory
between periods. There are no holding costs or back-order costs. In addition, the
products are perishable and have no salvage costs. This means that at the end of the
entire time horizon, any remaining products will be worthless. The demand function
each seller faces for each product is uncertain and is affected by both the prices at
the current period and past pricing history for her and her competitors.
In this thesis, we address both the uncertain and the competitive aspect of the
problem. First, we study the uncertain aspect of the problem in a simplified setting,
where there is only one seller and two periods in the model. We use ideas of robust
optimization, adjustable robust optimization, dynamic programming and stochastic
optimization to find adaptable closed loop pricing policies. Theoretical and numerical
results show how the budget of uncertainty, the presence of a reference price, delayed
resource allocation, and feedback control affect the quality of the pricing policies.
Second, we extend the model to a multi-period setting, where the computation be-
comes a major issue. We use a delayed constraint generation method to significantly
increase the size of the problem that our models can handle. Finally, we consider
the pricing problem in an oligopoly setting. We show the existence of solution for
both the best response subproblem and the market equilibrium problem for all of the
models we discuss in the thesis. We also consider an iterative learning algorithm and
illustrate through simulations that an equilibrium pricing policy can be computed for
all of our models.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivations
In recent years, there has been a rising interest in revenue management in many in-
dustries such as the airline, the supply chain, and the retail industry. Many firms
have realized that the profitability of a firm is critically affected by decisions such
as pricing and inventory control. They invest more resources or even hire special-
ized consultants to help them to optimize their revenue management. Pricing is a
critical factor in revenue management. A study by McKinsey and Company on the
cost structure of Fortune 1000 companies in 2001 ([2]) shows that pricing is a more
powerful lever than variable cost, fixed cost or sales improvement. This reveals that
an improvement of 1% in pricing will yield an average of 8.6% in operating margin im-
provement. Therefore, a firm's ability to design a good pricing model will determine
its performance in today's competitive market.
1.1.1 Demand uncertainty
The traditional approach to the dynamic pricing problem assumes that the input data
is known exactly (that is, it always takes a nominal value). However, uncertainty is
inherent in nature and any forecast into the future will involve a certain level of ran-
domness. In addition, the demand model may not represent the relationship between
17
demand and price accurately. In fact, any demand model is just an approximation
of the true relationship between demand and price, as there are many more factors
that exist in reality and are not considered in this relationship in order to simplify
the modeling. Furthermore, even if the demand model is exact, it is still difficult to
determine the exact values of its parameters. One way to determine these parameters
is to learn them from the historical data. Still, it just gives an estimation of the
parameters, as the future cannot be inferred from the past in general.
One possible way of dealing with uncertain parameters is to assume that they
follow a certain probability distribution. With this assumption, dynamic program-
ming (DP) and stochastic optimization can be used to maximize the expected overall
profit effectively. DP is an attractive and powerful technique to address problems
with uncertainty. It models the overall dynamic decision process as a sequence of
simpler optimization problems. This feature makes it possible to reveal the theo-
retical structure of the optimal policy for simple systems. However, DP also has its
limitations. The main drawback is that the complexity of the underlying recursive op-
timization problem can explode with the number of state variables. This phenomenon
is commonly known as the "curse of dimensionality."
Stochastic optimization is another leading approach to problems with uncertainty.
Stochastic optimization takes advantage of the known probability distribution and
finds a pricing policy that maximizes the expected overall profit. The strength of
stochastic optimization is that recourse decisions can be made in the later stages in
order to compensate for any bad effects that might have been experienced as a result
of the decisions made in the earlier stages. Furthermore, stochastic optimization
does not suffer from the curse of dimensionality in the state variables. However, it
is limited to solving problems with few periods, as the number of possible scenarios
that it considers grows exponentially with the number of periods.
The assumption made by dynamic programming and stochastic optimization on
the probability distribution of the uncertain parameters being known in advance is
controversial. Similar to the problem in determining the exact value for the parame-
ters in the demand model, many researchers also question the validity of determining
18
the probability distribution from historical data. Thus, the need arises for a new
optimization methodology that can address uncertainty without making specific as-
sumptions on a probability distribution and that is computationally tractable.
Robust optimization has emerged as another popular approach to handling prob-
lems with uncertainty. Contrary to DP and stochastic optimization, it does not need
to assume any probability distribution on the uncertain parameters. The only as-
sumption it requires is that the uncertain parameters reside within a deterministic
uncertainty set with some known nominal values. Robust optimization adopts a min-
max approach to maximize the objective value in the worst-case scenario. It addresses
data uncertainty by guaranteeing the feasibility and optimality of the solution against
all possible instances of the parameters within the uncertainty set. Robust optimiza-
tion is also computationally attractive, and it has been successfully applied to some
large-scale and highly complex engineering problems. However, as it is maximizing
___ the objective value in the worst-case scenario, it has also been criticized as being too
conservative. To address this problem several robust optimization approaches have
been proposed recently. These include adjusting the level of conservativeness through
the notion of budget of uncertainty ([7]) or incorporating the idea of feedback control
into the robust model ([4]).
1.1.2 Oligopoly and competition
In a monopoly setting, each seller's objective is to find an optimal pricing policy
subject to her resource constraints. Her decision is not affected by other sellers'
strategies in the market. The pricing problem is essentially a constrained optimization
problem. However, in an oligopoly setting, competition among sellers arises, and one
seller's pricing policy is influenced by the pricing policies of other sellers in the market.
The fact that the pricing problem involves considerations about the pricing policies
of competitors causes these models to take the form of a game. A game-theoretic
framework may be required to study the pricing problem under these circumstances.
There are many ways of modeling competition in an oligopoly setting. For exam-
ple, sellers in the market can be cooperative and work together to achieve a global
19
optimal solution of the whole system. In this case, a seller may sacrifice her own
profit in order to work towards a global optimal solution. The strength of this model
is that it is able to achieve a better global solution. However, this is usually at the
cost of some sellers' own benefits. How to ensure that policies are fair to every seller
so that they are willing to stay cooperative in the game is an issue that needs to be
addressed in such a setting. In contrast, sellers can also be selfish by maximizing
their own profits without worrying about the global performance of the system. In
this model, a global optimal solution is unlikely to be obtained. However, fairness
can be easily achieved, as each seller is free to make her own decision and not forced
to sacrifice her benefit for others. This model is perhaps more realistic compared to
the previous model.
In this thesis, we consider an oligopoly setting with non-cooperative sellers, as we
believe it is a better model of reality Each seller competes with other sellers in the
market and seeks to optimize her own profits.
1.1.3 Closed-loop pricing policy
In an open-loop framework, the value of data over the entire time horizon is known
in advance. Under such a setting, each seller is able to find an optimal pricing policy
at time zero and commit to her decisions over the time horizon. However, when the
value of data is unknown or allowed to vary over time, an open-loop pricing policy
may perform very poorly, as it cannot adjust its decisions with respect to the changes
in the system. In contrast, in a closed-loop pricing policy, the decisions for prices can
be postponed until the last possible moment. It takes advantage of the fact that not
all decisions have to be made at time zero. For example, the price for the last time
period can be made at any time before the start of the last period. By postponing
the decisions for prices until the last possible moment, sellers are able to collect more
information about data and therefore, adjust their decisions to yield a higher overall
profit.
A closed-loop pricing policy is not interested in finding the optimal price for each
period but rather an optimal rule for setting a price for each period based on the
20
information that is available at that moment. For example, DP generates a look-up
table of optimal prices for each value of the state variable. Stochastic optimization
finds the optimal prices for every scenario that may occur. The robust optimization
paradigm has been recently extended to incorporate this aspect. This is termed as
affinely adjustable robust counterpart (AARC). The main feature in AARC is that
some of the decisions can be made after a portion of the uncertain data is realized.
1.2 Literature review
There is a huge literature on revenue management and pricing. In (23], Talluri and
van Ryzin provide an overview of the revenue management and pricing literature. In
this section, we focus on literature on three aspects of the pricing problem. First,
we review research that handles the uncertainty aspect in the pricing model. Then
we discuss papers related to oligopolistic competition. Finally, we discuss literature
relevant to the closed-loop policy and the notion of a reference price.
1.2.1 Demand uncertainty
The problem of demand uncertainty has motivated a significant amount of literature
in the field of revenue management. Various models have been introduced to model
demand uncertainty. In [26], Zabel introduces two models of demand uncertainty:
a multiplicative and an additive demand model. In the multiplicative- 'Model, the
demand at time t, denoted by dt, is defined as dt = qtu(pt), where pt is the price at
period t, rt is the uncertain factor that is assumed to follow either an exponential or
a uniform distribution with E[?I] ;> 0, and u(pt) is a decreasing function of pt. In
contrast, in the additive model, dt is defined as dt = u(pt) + 9 t.
In the Operations Research literature, there are several different ways of treating
demand uncertainty. For example, the uncertain parameters are sometimes assumed
to be deterministic first, and subsequently a sensitive analysis is performed to study
the stability of the solution with respect to the small perturbations of the parameters.
When the probability distribution of the underlying uncertain parameters is known,
21
stochastic optimization can be used to find a solution that either has a high expected
objective value or a low constraint violation. DP is also commonly used to handle
demand uncertainty, and it seeks to find an optimal solution for every value of the
state variable.
Unlike stochastic optimization or DP, robust optimization does not assume any
probability distribution of the uncertain parameters. Instead, it only requires the
parameters to reside within an uncertainty set with some known nominal values,
and uses a min-max approach to find an optimal solution in the worst-case scenario.
Robust optimization was first considered by Soyster (22]) in a linear optimization
problem, where the data is uncertain within a convex set. This work adopts a worst-
case approach, which, as a result, significantly decreased the performance of the
solution. To address the problem of over-conservativeness, Ben-Tal and Nemirovski
([5],[6]) consider an ellipsoidal uncertainty set. This approach applies to linear pro-
gramming and general convex programming. They show that the robust counterpart
of many convex optimization problems with data within an ellipsoidal uncertainty set
can be solved exactly or approximatively by polynomial-time algorithms. However,
the transformation required for this type of uncertainty set is complex. The robust
counterpart of a linear programming problem is reformulated as a second-order cone
programming (SOCP), and a SOCP is then reformulated as a semidefinite program-
ming (SDP), and the robust counterpart of SDP is NP-hard to solve. Bertsimas and
Sim ([7]) introduce a robust optimization model in which the robust counterpart of
linear optimization remains a linear optimization problem. They also introduce an
attractive way of adjusting the level of conservativeness through the notation of a
budget of uncertainty.
The robust optimization paradigm has been applied to a number of areas such as
the pricing problem. Perakis and Sood ([17]) and Perakis and Nguyen ([18]) study
a multi-period oligopolistic market for a perishable product setting with demand
uncertainty. They address competition and demand uncertainty using ideas from
robust optimization and quasi-variational inequalities. Nevertheless, the lack of feed-
back control in this model can make the robust approach overly conservative. In [15],
22
Goldfarb and Iyengar apply robust optimization to portfolio selection problems. They
introduce an uncertainty set that allows them to reformulate the robust counterpart
as SOCP.
1.2.2 Competition
Oligopolistic competition in the field of pricing has become a popular topic to research
in recent years. In [25], Vives presents several pricing models in an oligopoly market.
Fudenberg and Tirole ([12]) review a number of game theoretic models for pricing
and capacity decisions. Gaimon ([14]) studies both the open- and closed-loop Nash
equilibria for two firms and a single product setting, where the price and capacity
are determined to maximize the net profits. Kirman and Sobel ([16]) develop a
multi-period model of oligopoly with random demand. They show the existence of
equilibrium pricing strategies for the firm. In [20], Rosen shows existence of the
equilibrium solutions under concavity of the payoff to a seller with respect to its own
strategy space and convexity of the joint strategy space. Uniqueness is shown under
strict diagonal dominance of the Hessian matrix of the payoff function. Perakis and
Sood ([17]) and Sood ([21]) study the competitive multi-period pricing problem for a
single perishable product, while Perakis and Nguyen ([18]) study the same problem
for many perishable products sharing capacity. They use results from variational
inequality theory and robust optimization to establish the existence of the pricing
equilibrium policy and comment on the uniqueness of the pricing equilibrium policy.
Perakis and Adida ([1],[17]) present a continuous time optimal control model for
studying a dynamic pricing and inventory control problem with no back-orders. In
many cases, the equilibrium point is obtained by solving the differential form of the
Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions in these applications.
Quasi-variational inequalities in finite dimension have been widely studied to
model dynamic systems of conflict and cooperation, where the decisions are made over
a time horizon. Cavazzuti and others ([8]) introduce some relationships among Nash
equilibria, variational equilibria and dynamic equilibria for non-cooperative games.
Cubiotti ([10]) and Cubiotti and Yen ([11]) prove the existence of a solution for gener-
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alized quasi-variational inequalities in infinite-dimensional normed spaces under some
conditions.
Relaxation algorithms are powerful methods for computing Nash equilibrium poli-
cies when the problem is not tractable enough to solve the necessary conditions of
optimality. These iterative algorithms rely on averaging the current solution iterate
with the solution of the best response problem each player solves. Uryas'ev and Ru-
binstein ([24]) study the convergence of such algorithms in finite dimensions. They
find the equilibria of a non-cooperative game for some payoff function on a closed,
compact space.
1.2.3 Closed-loop policy and reference price
A closed-loop policy usually performs better than an open-loop policy when solving
problems with data uncertainty. Especially in the area of robust optimization, which
is often criticized for being overly-conservative, researchers are interested in bringing
the ideas of closed-loop policies or feedback control into this area in order to improve
its performance. In [4], Ben-Tal et al. introduce an affinely adjustable robust counter-
part (AARC) to model linear programs with uncertain parameters. They introduce
the notion of adjustable variables in order to refer to those variables that can be
chosen after the realization of the uncertain parameters. They show that AARC is
significantly less conservative than the usual robust counterpart and is tractable in
most cases. However, the demand is assumed to be exogenous in order to simplify the
problem. This is not realistic in the pricing problem. Researchers also look at stochas-
tic optimization to make this method more realistic and computationally tractable.
Chen and others ([9]) introduce a unified framework of approximating multi-period
stochastic optimization with safeguarding constraints, using ideas of robust optimiza-
tion. They have shown that the framework is computationally tractable in the form
of second order cone programming and scalable across periods.
Traditional economic marketing and operational models view the customers as
rational agents who make decisions based on the current prices and market conditions.
However, in a market with repeated interactions, customers' purchase decisions are
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also determined by past observed prices. In [19], Popescu and Wu study the dynamic
pricing problem of a monopolist firm, where demand is sensitive to the firm's past
pricing history. The consumers form a reference price based on the pricing history,
and their purchasing decisions are made by assessing prices as discounts or surcharges
relative to the reference price. The model considered in this paper is a deterministic
model, where all the parameters are known to be some nominal values.
1.3 The pricing problem and outline of the thesis
In this thesis, we consider a monopoly as well as an oligopoly pricing problem. In
the latter, several sellers simultaneously seek a pricing policy for their products. The
products are usually assumed to be differentiated and substitutable. Each seller has
the option to set prices for her products at each time period, and her goal is to find
a pricing policy that will yield the maximum overall profit. Each seller has a fixed
initial inventory of each product to be allocated over the entire time horizon and does
not have the option to produce additional inventory between periods. There are no
holding or back-order costs. In addition, the products are perishable and have no
salvage costs. This means that at the end of the entire time horizon, any remaining
products will be worthless. The demand function is a linear function of the prices,
and the parameters in the function are uncertain.
In order to address the demand uncertainty, some researchers have recently adopted
ideas from robust optimization to solve the pricing problem in which the demand is
only known to be within an uncertainty set rather than some nominal value. In order
to simplify the problem, most papers such as [4] have assumed that the demand un-
certainty is given exogenously and will not be affected by the seller's price. However,
in practice, the demand for a product will usually be affected by the seller's price and
her competitors' prices. In this thesis, we address demand uncertainty by modeling it
as a function of all sellers' prices for the current period, and the past pricing history.
We use the notation of reference price to model the past pricing history.
The main contributions of this thesis are as follows:
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1. We describe various dynamic pricing models with demand uncertainty. We use
ideas of robust optimization, adjustable robust optimization, dynamic program-
ming and stochastic optimization to find adaptable closed-loop pricing policies.
We study the tractability of solving these problems.
2. We study how the budget of uncertainty, the presence of a reference price,
delayed resource allocation, and feedback control affect the quality of the pricing
policies.
3. We address computational issues of these models in a multi-period setting.
4. We prove existence of solution for the best response subproblem as well as of
the market equilibrium problem for all of the models we discuss in this thesis.
5. We discuss an iterative learning algorithm and illustrate computationally its
convergence to an equilibrium pricing policy.
The thesis is outlined as follows. In Chapter 2, we introduce the notations that
are used throughout the thesis. We formulate a number of models for the pricing
problem. In Chapter 3, we consider a simplified setting, where there is a single seller
and two time periods in the model. We compare different models in this setting and
provide both theoretical and computational results regarding the effect of budget of
uncertainty, the presence of a reference price, delayed resource allocation and the
feedback control on the quality of the pricing policy. In Chapter 4, we extend the
problem to a monopoly and multi-period setting. We discuss how to address the
computational issues with the increase of time periods. In Chapter 5, we consider
an oligopoly market where the competition among sellers affects each seller's deci-
sion. We study the existence of Nash equilibrium of these models. In Chapter 6, we
conclude the thesis and discuss some possible future work in this research area.
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Chapter 2
Model formulation
In this chapter, we introduce the notations and assumptions that will be used through-
out the thesis. We discuss how to address the issue of uncertainty in demand and
what we mean by robust policies. Each seller faces the problem of finding a pricing
policy that maximizes her total profit from the sale of her inventory over the entire
time horizon. We call this pricing problem that each seller faces the best response
problem and the resulting pricing policy the best response policy. We focus on formu-
lating the best response problem for each single seller and leave the competition issue
aside in this chapter. Both the robust demand and stochastic demand are considered,
and the robust optimization, stochastic optimization and dynamic programming are
used to formulate the best response problem.
2.1 Notations
We denote the set of all sellers by I and a single seller by i E I. The set of all
competitors of seller i is denoted by -i. The time horizon is divided into a finite
number of time periods. We denote the ordered set of all time periods by T and a
single time period by t E T.
At the beginning of the time horizon, each seller i starts with a given inventory of
the products, denoted by Ci, and competes with her competitors by setting her price
p at each period t. We denote the prices set by the competitors of seller i at period
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t by pt i. Seller i's pricing policy over the entire time horizon consists of the prices
(pf, p , ... , pf) and is denoted by pi. The pricing policy for all the sellers consists of
the price vectors (p 1 , P2 , ... p) and is denoted by p. The demand function faced by
seller i, at period t, is denoted by hI.
2.2 Demand model
The demand function can assume various forms, depending on the assumptions we
make on the model. In a monopoly market, if the seller's past pricing history does not
have an impact on her demand function at the current period, the demand function
is simply a function of her price at the current period, i.e., h (p'). In contrast, when
the past pricing history is assumed to affect the current period's demand, the demand
function is of the form h (p , ri), where r is the reference price of seller i at period t.
The reference price r could be just the previous period's price pt 1 or an aggregated
value of all the past prices, depending on how long we assume that the past pricing
history can affect the future demand. Similarly, in a duopoly market, seller i's demand
function will also be affected by her competitors' prices.
2.2.1 Demand function with uncertainty
In this thesis, we adopt a common demand model where the demand is a linear
function of the price. For example, when we consider a monopoly setting and neglect
the effect of the reference price, the demand of seller i at time t can be written as:
ht = Dt - atpt
In practice, it is usually very difficult to determine the exact values of the pa-
rameters D' and ac. In this thesis, we assume that each of these parameters falls
into allowed ranges with some known nominal values. For instance, we denote the
nominal value of D by Dt and the deviation by UDt. The realization of D' belongs to
t- - -t
an interval centered around D~ with half-length 9D±, , DOC[D D , Dt + JrDJ
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We use cj to denote the uncertainty factor in seller i's demand at period t.
2.2.2 Various demand functions
Assumption 1. When the reference effect is not considered, the demand function
faced by seller i, at time period t, is only dependent on the prices set by all the sellers
at period t. That is,
ht(plpi,) = D - atp + /3 p _ , (2.1)
where ( = (Dj, ac, Of) denotes the uncertainty parameters and take any value in an
uncertainty set Ut.
Assumption 2. When the reference effect is considered, the demand function faced
by seller i, at period t, is dependent on the prices set by all the sellers at period t and
the past pricing history. The latter is represented by a reference price that is denoted
by rl. In this case, the demand function is defined as:
jr)= Dt -c apt +/3p (2.2)
where ci = (D', a', Of, 'y,) denotes the uncertainty parameters and takes any value in
an uncertainty set Ut.
Assumption 3. The demand function of seller i is a strictly decreasing linear func-
tion of her price, and an increasing linear function of her competitors' prices and her
reference price. Mathematically, D , ac, Of3, -yj are strictly positive real values.
Assumption 4. We model the reference price as r = gi(pt~1 , r- 1 ), where gi is a
linear function of p'~1 and r- 1. Furthermore, gi increases with respect to pt 1 and
with respect to rt- 1.
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2.2.3 Budget of uncertainty
One problem with the robust optimization paradigm is that it may lead to an overly
conservative solution that would allow uncertain parameters to be at the value cor-
responding to the worst-case scenario at all times. Nevertheless, such a scenario is
highly unlikely to occur. To overcome this drawback of robust optimization, litera-
ture often introduces a budget of uncertainty F to bound the cumulative dispersion
of the realized parameters around the nominal values over time (see [7]).
The budget of uncertainty is a very effective way to measure the trade-off between
performance and conservativeness. A small budget of uncertainty gives less protection
against data perturbation, but it gives better objective values. In contrast, a high
budget of uncertainty gives better protection, but at the cost of performance.
The budget of uncertainty is chosen by seller i to reflect his attitude towards
uncertainty and is data to the problem. When J is zero, seller i is considering a
deterministic pricing problem, where all the uncertainty parameters are forced to
take their nominal values. On the other hand, when Vi is large, seller i allows more
variation or uncertainty on the parameters. In this case, seller i is considering the
worst-case scenario, and the robust formulation becomes more conservative (i.e., risk-
averse).
With the notation of budget of uncertainty, we can define the uncertainty set as
follows:
* when the reference price effect is not considered, the uncertainty set Uj is defined
as:
U> + +
where D, -i, and O3 are the nominal values of the uncertainty parameters,
(D, J a, and uot are the deviations of the uncertainty parameters around the
nominal values, and FIt is the budget of uncertainty. All these parameters are
data to the problem.
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* when the reference price effect is considered, Uj becomes:
{il (D'~{3vD cY Ua U
2.3 Best response problem
In this section, we formulate the best response problems for both the robust demand
model and the stochastic demand model. In the robust demand model, the parameters
in the demand function are uncertain and only known to belong to some uncertainty
set. For this demand model, we have formulated four different robust optimization
models, which are labeled as Robust-Mi, Robust-M2, Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-
AARC respectively. In these four robust optimization models, each seller adopts a
pricing policy that is robust to all the possible realizations of the uncertain parame-
ters. However, in the stochastic demand model, the parameters are assumed to follow
a known probability distribution, and each seller adopts a policy that maximizes her
expected total profit.
2.3.1 Robust demand model
Robust-Mi
In this robust formulation, we do not consider the reference effect in the demand
function. Furthermore, the decisions that each seller needs to make are both the
price and amount of resource allocated for sale at each period. Let i = (Di, a, 0j).
The mathematical formulation is as follows:
T
max p1 x min (D' - acpt + /3 tpti)
t=1 EU
T
s.t. min (D - acpt + #t_.) <0C,
p >Ot= 1,2, ... T
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where Ut=) =(Dt, cef, O) : + + I~' , t = 1, 2, ..., T.
ZOD1at O ot
As can be seen in the model above, the amount of resource allocated for sale at
period t has been implicitly fixed to be min tUt (D - czp +,tpt  ). This means
that the demand is no longer determined by nature (i.e., by the actual realization of
uncertain parameters), but by the value of parameters corresponding to the worst-
case scenario within the uncertainty set. In other words, we price considering the
worst possible scenario of demand that might occur. The strength of this formulation
is that it reduces the side effect caused by uncertainty, as the amount of resource
allocated for sale at each period is decided at time zero and it is guaranteed to
be sold out. Therefore, each seller can optimize and determine her profit at time
zero, without worrying that her prices may cause a violation of the resource capacity
constraint. Nevertheless, the drawback of this model is that the objective value is
fixed and will not increase even when the actual realization of parameters are not
corresponding to the worst-case scenario. Next, we will compare this model with
other robust optimization models.
Robust-M2
This robust optimization model is the same as Robust-Mi except that we consider
the reference price effect in the demand function. The mathematical formulation is
as follows:
T
max p x min (Dt - cept + Oi3pti + yit r )
T
s.t. min (Dt - o pt + p_ + ytrt) < C,
t=1
p >0 t = 1 2..., T
where U = =(D)++ + , <J741 t =
1, 2, ... ,) T, and rl = 0.
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Robust-M3
This robust optimization model differs from Robust-Mi in the sense that it allows
nature decide the demand rather than pre-allocating the amount of resource for sale.
Each seller only needs to decide her price set at each period. However, the prices
have to be chosen such that the cumulative demand over the time horizon does not
go beyond the total capacity the seller has for all the possible realizations of uncertain
parameters. The reference price effect is not considered in this model. In addition,
we cannot set D - alp + >3pt_  0 as a constraint for all the possible values in
the uncertainty set in order to ensure the non-negativity of the demand, as this may
make the price overly constrained and solution sub-optimal or even infeasible. In
fact, the demand is only required to be non-negative for the realization of uncertain
parameters that corresponds to the optimal solution. To address this issue, we use
max{p (D - acp + O3tp'), 0} to represent seller i's demand at period t in our model.
In this case, seller i can set any price for her product. If the price chosen leads to
a negative demand, a zero demand (rather than negative demand) is used in the
objective function and the resource capacity constraint. By doing this, an optimal
solution to the model can be found, as the seller is given freedom to set her prices,
and the "correct" amount of demand is always used in the model. The mathematical
formulation is as follows:
max z
z,p
T
s.t. z < Z max{p'(D' -apE+ tpt ), 0}, V(Dt , c , ) E U
t=1
T
max{Dt - ap + 3pti, 0} C , V(Dt , a ,3#) E Ut
t=1
p >Ot =1,2, ..., T
where U = = (D ,a,3): D +, t + ,t=12...IT.
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Robust-M3-AARC
This model is a modification of Robust-M3 by adding some feedback control into the
model. When the feedback control is considered, seller i's decision for her price at
period t is postponed to the end of period t-1. This is achieved by modeling p as an
affine function of the uncertainty parameters D , O realized by the end of period
t-1. That is,
t-1 t-1 t-1
gi7T t +o D±Zwk ik+ZAfi (2.3)
k=O k=1 k=1
This idea is inspired by the Affinely Adjustable Robust Counterpart (AARC) in-
troduced in [4], where the robust formulation with the feedback control has been
proven to be less conservative than the traditional robust formulation. The mathe-
matical formulation of this model is as follows:
max z
T
s.t. z < Z max{p'(Dt - atp + ) E
t= 1
T
max{Dt - apt + p} C , V(Dt, c Ei U
t= 1
t-1 t-1 t-1
Pi 7i + 5 9Di + 5 ic + E A i
k=O k=1 k=1
where = = (D ,oa,Ofl) : + -- &i + 1 1,2...T, and
D9 = 0, ao = 0 # = 0.
2.3.2 Stochastic demand model
In this section, we consider a stochastic demand model, where the uncertain parame-
ters are assumed to follow some known probability distribution. In the computational
part of this thesis, we assume the uncertain parameters follow a uniform distribution.
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Dynamic programming formulation
In the dynamic programming formulation, the state variable is the remaining inven-
tory at the start of each period, which is denoted by s'. As the uncertain parameters
are assumed to follow a uniform distribution, we discretize them into a finite number
of values with equal probabilities. Let fj(s ) denote the optimal expected profit seller
i can make from period t until the end of the time horizon with remaining inventory
si. The reference effect is not considered in the demand function. The mathematical
formulation is as follows:
fi(s') = max E{pt -min(s', D' - cept + /3 p_) + fj+1(s|+1)}
Pi
st+1 = st - min(st, D' - atpt + )
ff+1(S[+1 ) = 0
Stochastic optimization formulation
In the stochastic optimization formulation, as before, we discretize the uncertain
parameters into a finite number of values with equal probabilities. Each combination
of these parameter values corresponds to a single scenario. Let w index these scenarios,
and let N denote the total number of scenarios we consider. Obviously, each scenario
has a probability of I to occur. The mathematical formulation is as follows:
N
N T ti(i a ,P , + 3 wpt i g )
max E 
-
P" N
w=1 t=1
T
s.t. 5 (Dt, - apP + Tp-i w) ; C, w = 1, 2, ...N
t=1
p, ;> 0, W = 1,2, ... , N and t = 1, 2, ...,T
2.4 Analysis of the robust best response problem
In this section, we study the existence of a solution to the robust optimization mod-
els that we have formulated in the previous section for a given competitor's price
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p-i. We start by listing some assumptions that are assumed on the problem. These
assumptions will be used to establish the existence of the solution.
2.4.1 Assumptions
Assumption 5. The price at period t for seller i is only allowed to vary between a
minimum, denoted by p ,min, and a maximum allowable level denoted by pmax. We
require pmin to be strictly positive and Plmax to be a level at which the demand for
seller i vanishes irrespective of her competitors' prices at that period. Mathemati-
cally, we require that PA,min > 0 and supt (hi(p,max, pi, ()) = 0 for all t E T.
Assumption 6. At any period t, for any fixed p'i and Q U , seller i's demand
function ht(p , pti, ) is decreasing with respect to p over the set of feasible prices.
Assumption 5 ensures that the space of allowed prices is bounded, which is
achieved by constraining the prices between some allowable upper and lower limits.
With this condition, we eliminate strategies involving infinitely high price levels.
Assumption 6 ensures that the demand at any period for any seller does not
increase with an increase in her price. In our demand model, as the demand is a
linear function of prices, this condition is automatically satisfied.
2.4.2 Existence of solution
Proposition 1. Consider a fixed price for competitors, i.e., p-i. Then there exists
a solution to the best response robust optimization model.
Proof. For Robust-Mi and Robust-M2, it is easy to show that the feasible space is
non-empty and compact under Assumption 5. Since the demand function is a linear
function of the price, the objective function is in fact a quadratic function of the price,
pl. This function is continuous and concave. Under these conditions, there exists a
solution according to Weierstrass theorem (see [3]).
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For Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC, the presence of maxjp }(D -azp +Ojp)
makes the robust formulations non-convex. However, we can eliminate this problem
by introducing a Mixed Integer Problem (MIP) formulation to replace max{p (D -
alp +s3ipti), 0}. Details about this MIP formulation are shown in the next chapter.
The outcome of this MIP formulation is that the resulting models of Robust-M3 and
Robust-M3-AARC are still convex formulations, if we neglect the integral require-
ment on variable K, which is used in the MIP formulation and can only take a value
of either 0 or 1. One value of , is required for each time period. Therefore, for an
n-period pricing problem, there are a total of 21 possible ways of assigning values
to n. For each of the value assignments of K, the resulting models get rid of K and
become similar to Robust-Mi and Robust-M2, for which we have proven the existence
of a solution. Therefore, to find the solution to Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC,
we just try all the 2' possible ways of assigning values to K, and the one that gives
the best result will be a solution to these models. This shows that a solution exists
for Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC as well. El
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Chapter 3
Uncertain data in a monopoly and
two-period setting
We first consider a simplified pricing problem, where there is only one seller and two
time periods in the model. The reason for studying this setting is that a single-
seller, two-period problem is relatively easier to formulate and study, and yet, gives
us insight into the pricing problem in a more general equilibrium setting. We discuss
the approaches to solving all the best response models, which are the foundation of
the equilibrium problem, presented in the previous chapter in this setting.
In this chapter, we study the six models we have formulated in the previous chap-
ter, which are Robust-Mi, Robust-M2, Robust-M3, Robust-M3-AARC, dynamic pro-
gramming and stochastic optimization models. We provide both theoretical insights
and computational results to show the effects of budget of uncertainty, reference price,
delayed resource allocation and feedback control on the quality of the pricing policy.
3.1 Simplified notations
Since we only consider one seller and two periods in this chapter, to simplify the
notations, we drop the seller's index i. Now, let pt denote the seller's price at period
t, where t E {1, 2}. If the reference effect is not considered, the seller's demand at
period t is defined as ht(pt, t) = Dt -atpt, where &e = (Dt, at) denotes the uncertainty
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parameters and takes any value in the uncertainty set Ut. Set Ut is defined as:
Ut = = (D t, at) : D , ,+ a 't .
Dt Jat
Similarly, if the reference effect is considered, the demand function at the second
period is affected by the price at the first period, and it is defined as h2 (P1 ,P 2 , 2) =
D2 - a2P2 + 02P1, where 2 = (D 2 , a 2 ,/2) can take any value in the uncertainty set
U2. Set U2 is defined as:
2 D2 - D2 + 02 - 2 + 2 - 2
UD2 Ua2 OrO2
Note that U1 remains unchanged, as there is no past pricing history available at the
start of the first period.
3.2 Solving the six monopoly models
In this section, we discuss the solution of the six models we considered in the previous
chapter. In particular, we show how to transform the robust optimization models
to their corresponding robust counterpart problems in order to solve these models
efficiently. The dynamic programming and stochastic optimization models are solved
through discretizing the parameters.
3.2.1 Robust optimization models
In the robust formulation, the capacity constraint has to be enforced for every possible
realization of the uncertain parameters in the uncertainty set specified by the budget
of uncertainty. Clearly, there is an infinite number of possible realizations of the
parameters. This leads to an infinite number of constraints in the model. Clearly, we
need to reformulate the original robust optimization model to a new problem with a
finite number of constraints. The resulting robust representation is called the robust
counterpart to the original robust optimization model.
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Proposition 2. The minimum of the uncertain demand over the uncertainty set, de-
noted by min ,Eu, (Dt - atpt), where Ut = { t = (Dt, ct) D- + 0a < £9>,
miOeu Dt + at-t
will only occur at two extreme points, which are (Ut - 9D, x Itt, Zt) and (t, t +o-c, x
rt). When the reference effect is considered, the minimum of the uncertain demand,
denoted by min 2Eu 2 (D 2 - a2P2 + fl2Pl) will only occur at three extreme points, which
are (D2 - o'D2 X r2, 2, 02), (D 2 , 2 + a2 X 1F2, /32) and (D 2 , T 2 , 32 - O-02 X 1'2) , where
U2 = {2 = (D2, if2,02) : D2 52 1 + 2- 2  2-+1, 2 -1
Pa + r' 01 + 32
Proof. The proof follows due to the linearity of the demand function. E
Robust counterpart of Robust-Mi
Let St denote the set of extreme points specified in Proposition 2. The robust coun-
terpart of Robust-Mi in a monopoly and two-period setting becomes:
2
max Pt x min (D - atpt)
t=1 (Dt,at)ESt
2
s.t. min (Dt - atpt) C,
SA =1 (D ,at)ESt
pt > 0,t = 1,2,
where D - + at' t, t = 1, 2.
The robust counterpart of Robust-Mi can be implemented using any optimization
tool such as ILOG.
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Robust counterpart of Robust-M2
Similarly, the robust counterpart of Robust-M2 becomes:
2
max E Pt X min (Dt - oapt + ytrt)
t=1 (Dt,at)ESt
2
s.t. min (Dt - atpt + trt) C,SA =1Y (D te ct)ESt
pt Ot = 1,2
where Dt-t a t-zt -+ L-t, t = 1, 2, and r1 = 0.
Robust counterpart of Robust-M3
There is a problem with the representation of max{pt(Dt - atpt),O} in Robust-
M3: if we introduce a slack variable zt to replace max{pt(Dt - atpt),0}, where
zt pt(Dt - atpt) and zt 0, this formulation becomes unbounded, as it is a
maximization problem.
In order to solve this problem, we adopt ideas from mixed integer programming
(MIP) to represent max{pt(Dt - atpt), 0}.
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Proposition 3. The robust counterpart of Robust-M3 can be represented as:
max z
2
s.t. z < E zt
t=1
2
E d, < C
t=1
t-1 t-1
Pt =1rt + EOkDk + WOak
k=O k=1
zt pt(Dt - atpt) + M(1 - ), V(D, at) E St
Zt < MK
Dt - atpt MK,V(Dt, at) E St
Dt - atpt + M(I - n) > 0, V (Dt, at) E St
dt Dt - atpt, V(Dt, at) E St
dc 0, t = 0, 1
n E {0, 1},
where Dt - +t t Zit2.
1 Dt I+ IactI<Flt=1
Proof. To prove this result, we need to illustrate that we can replace max{pt(Dt -
atpt), 0} by zt with the following additional constraints:
zt pt(Dt - acpt) + M(1 - K)
zt < Mr,
Dt - atpt Mn
Dt - atpt + M(1 - r,) > 0,
m E {0, 1}
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
where M denotes a very large number.
We examine the following three cases to ensure that this is a correct representation:
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1. If Dt - atpt > 0, then K = 1. Subsequently, it follows that zt pt(Dt - atpt)
from constraint (1) and zt M from constraint (2). Since M is a very large
number, zt < M becomes redundant, and we have zt pt(Dt - atpt) as the
final result.
2. If Dt - atpt = 0, then , = 0 or 1. In either case, it follows that zt < 0 from
constraint (1) and (2).
3. If Dt - atpt < 0, then r = 0 due to (4). Subsequently, it follows that zt
Pt(Dt - atpt) + M from constraint (1) and zt 0 from constraint (2). Since
M is a very large number, zt < 0 is a tighter constraint and becomes the final
result.
As we are maximizing z in the model, zt is forced to be equal to max{pt(Dt -atpt), 0}.
In contrast, we can safely replace {Dt - atpt, 0} with a dummy variable dt in the
resource capacity constraint, as dt is bounded by capacity C.
Based on the analysis above, this MIP representation is equivalent to Robust-M3.
More importantly, Robust-M3 remains a convex optimization problem, if we relax
the integral requirement on r,. El
Robust counterpart of Robust-M3-AARC
Robust-M3-AARC has the same problem as Robust-M3 in the representation of
max{pt(Dt - actpt), 0}. We use the same MIP formulation to resolve this problem. In
addition, as the price is modeled as an affine function of the uncertain parameters
realized in the past periods, the objective function becomes a quadratic function of
uncertain parameters. Therefore, the realized values of uncertain parameters that
lead to the worst-case scenario may not only occur at the two extreme points as we
explained before. Instead, they can be any of the four extreme points, or points that
make the resource capacity constraint tight. In this thesis, we make an approximation
by only considering the four extreme points for each uncertain parameter. We study
how good this approximation is through simulation at a later chapter. Let St denote
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the set of four extreme points, which are (D - xDt x Ft, t), (D - aD+ X t, TO
(Dt, t + ac, x Ft), (D, Zt - aet x Ft). The robust counterpart becomes:
max z
2
s.t. z < E zt
t=1
2
Z dt < C
t=1
t-1 t-1
Pt t + ZOkDk +Z Wkak
k=O k=1
zt _ p(Dt - atpt) + M(1 - rz), V(Dt, at) E St
zt < Mr,
Dt - acpt M,,V(Dt, at) E St
Dt - atpt + M(l - r) 0, V(D, at) E St
dt Dt - atpt, V(Dt, at) E St
dt > 0, t = 0, 1
n E {0, 1},
where Dt -Dt < - t) t = 17 2.O'Dt q
3.2.2 A heuristic approach to solving the dynamic program-
ming model
In the dynamic programming model, the state variable, denoted as st, is the inventory
left at the start of period t. As the state variable can take any value between 0 and
the total capacity C, it is an infinite-state dynamic programming problem. Our
approach to handling the infinite-state problem is to discretize the state variable into
a finite number of discrete values. When the discretization becomes fine, the dynamic
programming model gives solutions equal or close to the optimal solution.
Similarly, we assume that the uncertain parameters follow a uniform distribution
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and discretize them into a finite number of values. The dynamic programming model
in a monopoly and two-period setting becomes:
ft(st) = max E{pt - min(st, Dt - atpt) + ft+1(st+1)}
Pt
st+1 = st - min(st, Dt - atpt)
fT+1(ST+1) = 0
In order to solve the dynamic programming model at each stage, we need to decide
the optimal way of splitting the remaining inventory st between the resource used at
the current period and the resource carried over to the next period. We denote the
amount of inventory used at period t by se, and the amount of inventory carried over
to period t+1 by sl, i.e., st = su + s1. Clearly, su can take any value between 0 and
st. To find the optimal value for su, we discretize st into a finite number of values.
We try each of these values for su and solve the problem. By doing this, we try all
the possible ways of splitting the inventory between the current stage and the next
stage. The optimal solution corresponds to the split that gives the highest expected
profit. Both Dt and at are discretized into N values. We index the values of (Dt, at)
by k. There are N2 ways of discretizing (Dt, at) in total. Each has a probability of
1 to occur. We first ignore the resource capacity constraint and solve the dynamic
programming model at each step as follows:
ft(st) = max E{pt -min(st, Dt - atpt) + ft+1(st+i)}Pt
N 2
ft(st) = max pt - (Dk - a. pt) - + ft+i(st+i)Pt t t r t tk==1
Next, we choose pt that makes the derivative of the current stage's profit equal to
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zero.
N 2  N 2
Vpt( pt - (D' - acpt)) = S(D - 2acpt) = 0
k=1 k=1
4
zk=1 D
Based on pt derived above, the expected demand, denoted by E(D), is computed
using the nominal value of D and a:
E(D) = D - atpt
The optimal decision for the price at the current stage, denoted as pt"t, depends on
the following two cases:
1. If E(D) < se, the resource allocated for the current stage is sufficient for setting
opt
pt as the optimal price for the current stage. Therefore, pt = pt, and ft(st) =
opt
Pt ' E(D)+ ft+(st - E(D)).
2. If E(D) > su, the demand determined by pt is greater than the amount of
resource being allocated. As it is a quadratic function, the optimal price will
make the determined demand equal to su, i.e., pt =t" and ft(st) =
P -t s + ft+1 (St - sU).
3.2.3 Stochastic optimization model
Stochastic optimization is another framework for modeling optimization problems
that involve uncertainty. In the robust formulation, the parameters are assumed to
be known only within bounds, and the goal is to find a solution which is feasible for all
such data and optimal in some sense. Stochastic optimization models are similar in
style but take advantage of the fact that probability distribution governing the data
are known or can be estimated. The goal here is to find some policy that is feasible
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for all (or almost all) the possible data instances and maximizes the expectation of
some function of the decisions and the random variables.
We assume the uncertainty parameters follow a uniform distribution. For a two-
period pricing problem, we discretize each of uncertain parameters into four values.
Therefore, we have (4 * 4)2 = 256 possible scenarios in total.
3.3 Comparison of six models
In this section, we examine all six models we presented and study how the effect
of a reference price, budget of uncertainty, delayed resource allocation and feedback
control affect the pricing policy.
3.3.1 Test instances
Five test instances, labeled from testI.dat through test5.dat, were designed for testing.
All the input parameters were generated randomly, and the budget of uncertainty Ft
was randomly chosen as long as both Dt - FrtED, 0, and -t - FtE, 0 hold.
3.3.2 The effect of reference price
Proposition 4. The presence of the reference price improves the objective value
of the resulting pricing policy. In other words, the objective value of Robust-M2 is
higher than that of Robust-Mi.
Proof. Let z1 and z2 be the optimal objective values of Robust-Mi and Robust-M2,
respectively, and let (p*, p*) be the optimal prices in Robust-MI. There are two
possible cases:
1. If (p*, p2) satisfies the resource capacity constraint in Robust-M2, it is also a fea-
sible solution to Robust-M2. Let z1' be the objective value of Robust-M2 with
solution (p*, p*). Clearly, zi' is greater than z1, as min 2EU 2 (D2 - a2P + 32P*)
min 2EU 2 (D 2 - a 2p2 ). Hence, z2 > z1' > zl.
48
2. If (p*, pA) violates the resource capacity constraint in Robust-M2, increase p* to
p*+Ap2 such that min 1 EU, (D 1 - ap*)+min 2 Eu 2 (D 2 - a2(P* + Ap2) + /2p*) =
C. Note that the price and demand at the first period remain the same,
which implies that the profit obtained at the first period remains the same
in both models. However, in Robust-M2, the demand at the second period is
min 6eU 2 (D 2 - a2(P2 + AP2 ) + /2p*), which is equal to C-min ,EUi (D 1 - alp*),
while in Robust-Mi, the demand at the second period is C-min 2 EU2 (D 2 - a2P*),
which is less or equal to C - minni eu 1 (D 1 - alp*). This shows that the demand
at the second period in Robust-M2 is at least equal to that in Robust-Mi. As
a result, the profit obtained at the second period in Robust-M2 is greater than
that in Robust-Mi. Therefore, z2 > zl.
Computational results
As can be seen in Table A.1, the profit obtained in Robust-M2 is greater than that
in Robust-Mi for all the five test instances.
3.3.3 The effect of the budget of uncertainty
Proposition 5. The increase in the budget of uncertainty will decrease the objective
value in the resulting pricing policy.
Proof. The proof follows easily: for the same set of uncertain parameters, a higher
budget of uncertainty leads to a larger uncertainty set in the sense that it is a superset
of the uncertainty set corresponding to a smaller budget uncertainty. As we consider
the worst-case profit with respect to the uncertain parameters within the uncertainty
set, for fixed prices, the profit obtained with a larger budget of uncertainty will always
be less or equal to that obtained with a smaller budget of uncertainty. El
However, the robust optimization model is designed so that there is no violation
of constraints for any realization of uncertain parameters that lie within the budget of
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uncertainty. Since the actual realizations of uncertain parameters may not satisfy the
budget of uncertainty, it is possible that the resource capacity constraint is violated
by the robust solution. We expect that the higher the budget of uncertainty, the
less likely that the robust solution violates the resource capacity constraint, since the
protection level increases with the budget of uncertainty.
Computational results
In order to study how the budget of uncertainty affects the quality of the pricing
policy, we increase the budget of uncertainty in test4.dat, which is 0.1 for both peri-
ods, using a step of 0.1 and obtain eight new test instances, which are labeled from
test6.dat through testl3.dat. We run Robust-M3 on all these nine test instances to
see how the budget of uncertainty affects the profit obtained by the robust solution.
We also assume the uncertain parameters follow a uniform distribution. We generate
a large number of sample points of the actual realization of uncertain parameters and
compute the probability of constraint violation for each budget of uncertainty.
The profits obtained by these nine test instances are shown in Table A.2, and
the corresponding plot is shown in Figure B-1. We can see that with the increase of
the budget of uncertainty from 0.1 to 0.9, the profit obtained decreases from 137.603
to 0.45. However, the probability of constraint violation also drops from 45.05% to
3.98%. This shows that an increase of budget of uncertainty has double effects on the
robust solution. On the one hand, the profit obtained decreases, as the seller adopts
a more conservative attitude towards uncertainty. On the other hand, the probability
of constraint violation decreases too, as the protection level increases.
3.3.4 The effect of the delayed resource allocation
In this section, we compare Robust-Mi (this model determines the amount of re-
sources for sale at time zero) with Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC (these models
let nature decide the demand based on the price set for that period and the actual
realization of the uncertain parameters). We are interested in knowing which way of
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determining the resource allocation leads to a better pricing policy, and what are the
advantages and disadvantages with each type of resource allocation.
Computational results
The profits obtained by Robust-Mi, Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC for five test
instances are shown in Table A.3. As can be seen in the table, the worst-case profits
obtained by Robust-Mi are higher than those of Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC
for test2.dat and test5.dat, and the same for the rest of the three test instances. An-
other interesting observation is that the profits obtained by Robust-M3 and Robust-
M3-AARC are the same for all the five test instances.
This result is not surprising. Although Robust-Mi determines the resource al-
location at time zero (which may appear to be less flexible than Robust-M3 and
Robust-M3-AARC), it actually gets rid of the risk of violating the resource capacity
constraint by the realization of uncertain parameters. In Robust-Mi, the resource
allocated at each period is pre-fixed to be min(Dt,at)Es (Dt - atpt). As set St only
contains the two extreme points, we know exactly where the worst-case scenario can
happen, and therefore, we can do a better optimization and achieve a higher profit.
In contrast, although Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC have the flexibility of let-
ting nature decide the demand based on the actual realized value of parameters, they
have to be better protected for whatever might occur in the future. In Robust-M3
and Robust-M3-AARC, the prices are chosen so that the sum of the highest possible
demands is still less than the total capacity C. With this constraint, the prices have
to be chosen relatively high, as otherwise, the sum of corresponding demands may
exceed the total capacity. However, in the calculation of the objective value, the
worst-case scenario is still considered in these two models. In contrast, as Robust-Mi
pre-fixes the resource allocation to the worst-case demand, it allows the prices to be
more flexible, and the sum of demand will not exceed the total capacity. Therefore,
when we maximize the worst-case profit, Robust-Mi gives a better objective value
than that of Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC.
However, the advantages of Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC lie in the flexibility
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of the demand being determined by the actual realization of uncertain parameters,
and this makes these two models work better on the actual realization of uncertain
parameters. In contrast, as both the price and demand are pre-determined in Robust-
M1, the profit obtained will not change with respect to the actual realization of
uncertain parameters. In order to see the effect of the delayed resource allocation,
we compare the total profits obtained by these three models on the first five test
instances. A Matlab code was written to randomly generate a substantially large
number of sample points of the actual realizations of uncertainty parameters, and
compute the total profits obtained by these three models.
The comparison of the profits obtained by these three models for five test instances
are shown from Figure B-2 to Figure B-6. From these figures, we can see that for
testl.dat, test3.dat and test4.dat, since the worst-case profits obtained by these three
models are the same, the profits obtained by Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC for
all the sample points are above or just cutting the profit obtained by Robust-Mi.
Even for test2.dat and test5.dat, although the worst-case profit of Robust-Mi is
higher than those of the other two models, we can still see that for the majority of
sampling points, the actual profits obtained by Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC
are higher than that of Robust-Mi. These results show that although Robust-M3
and Robust-M3-AARC may "lose" to Robust-Mi in the worst-case scenario, they, in
general, outperform Robust-Mi.
We also count the percentage of sample points for which the profit of Robust-Mi
is greater than that of Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC, respectively. The result
is shown in Table A.4. We can see that even for test2.dat, there are only 0.55% and
1.46% from the total sample points for which Robust-Mi outperforms Robust-M3
and Robust-M3-AARC, respectively. For test5.dat, the ratios are higher, but still,
there are only 13.21% of sample points for which Robust-Mi has a higher profit than
the other two models.
From these comparisons, we conclude that determining the resource allocation at
time zero has the advantage of reducing the difficulty caused by the uncertain param-
eters, and therefore, improves the performance in the worst-case scenario. However,
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the cost associated with this early resource allocation is that it loses the flexibility of
adjusting to the actual realization of parameters. Hence, the actual performance of
Robust-Mi is not as good as that of the other two models in general.
3.3.5 The effect of feedback control
Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC are exactly the same, except that in Robust-M3-
AARC, we incorporate the idea of feedback control by modeling the price at the
second period as an affine function of the uncertainty realized at the first period. In
this section, we compare Robust-M3 with Robust-M3-AARC to see how the feedback
control affects the pricing policy.
We can see from Table A.3 that the worst-case profits obtained by these two models
on all the five test instances are the same. This is as expected: if we look closely at the
formulations of these two models, the only difference is that the second period's price
is modeled as an affine function of D1 and a, in Robust-M3-AARC. This should not
cause any difference to the worst-case profits. For any optimal price to Robust-M3,
we can always find coefficients for the affine function such that the second period's
price in Robust-M3-AARC is the same as that in Robust-M3. Conversely, for any
set of coefficients of the affine function in the optimal solution of Robust-M3-AARC,
we can always set the second period's price in Robust-M3 to the value of that affine
function in Robust-Mi. Therefore, the profits obtained in the worst-case scenario
should be the same for both models.
However, the affine function gives Robust-M3-AARC the ability to adjust its prices
based on the uncertain parameters realized before. We can treat this as a tuning
effect that adjusts the prices, most likely, towards an increase of the overall profit.
The tuning effect of the affine function can be intuitively seen as follows: according
to the affine function, P2 increases if D1 increases or a 1 decreases. When D1 increases
or a, decreases, it is usually a sign that the realized demand at period 1 is higher
than what the seller has estimated. Therefore, considering the total limited amount
of resources the seller has, the resources left for sale at period 2 might be less than
she has expected to sell. The best response now is to increase the price at the second
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period so that the demand at period 2 will decrease, and the profit obtained in period 2
can be maximized. We can see from Figure B-2 to Figure B-6 that the profit obtained
by Robust-M3-AARC is, in general, above that of Robust-M3.
It is worth pointing out that the affine function does not guarantee the improve-
ment in the objective value. Sometimes, it may even cause the profit to be lower
than that obtained in Robust-M3 for some realization of uncertain parameters (see
Table A.5). This is reasonable. The affine function may not be a good modeling of
the relationship between the price and parameters realized before. A higher order
function may be a better modeling tool; however, it will introduce much more com-
plexity to the model. Nevertheless, we still expect that with the introduction of the
affine function, Robust-M3-AARC will outperform Robust-M3 for most of the sample
points. To see this, we count the percentage of sample points for which the profit of
Robust-M3 is higher than that of Robust-M3-AARC, which is shown in Table A.5.
We can see from the table that the highest percentage of such points is still less than
25%. This shows that the affine function does help to improve the pricing policy on
average.
3.3.6 Comparison of the dynamic programming model with
the robust optimization models
In this section, we compare the profits obtained by Robust-Mi, Robust-M3-AARC
and the dynamic programming model for all five test instances.
The comparison of the profits obtained by these three models for five test instances
are shown from Figure B-7 to Figure B-11. We can see from these figures that the
profits obtained by Robust-M3-AARC and dynamic programming are very close for
most of the sample points, and both of these models have a higher profit than that
of Robust-Mi, in general. Taking a close look from Figures B-7 to Figure B-11, we
observe that the curve obtained by the dynamic programming model is just slightly
above that of Robust-M3-AARC. For some of sample points, Robust-M3-AARC even
outperforms the dynamic programming model. The percentage of points for which the
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dynamic programming "loses" to the other models may be caused by the discretization
of uncertain parameters and the state variable we have performed in order to solve the
dynamic programming model. As as result, this only provides an incomplete look-up
table. A finer discretization will help to improve the performance of the dynamic
programming model.
We count the number of sample points for which the profit obtained by Robust-
M3-AARC is greater than that of the dynamic programming model, which is shown
in Table A.6. We can see from this table that for most of the test instances, for more
than 10% of the total sample points, Robust-M3-AARC has a higher profit than
that of the dynamic programming model. Specially for test5.dat, the percentage of
such points is as high as 28%. This comparison shows that although the dynamic
programming model does give the best pricing policy among all these models, Robust-
M3-AARC gives a result very close to that of the dynamic programming model or
even outperforms it for some of sample points.
3.3.7 Comparison of the stochastic optimization model with
the robust optimization models
In this section, we compare the profits obtained by Robust-Mi, Robust-M3, Robust-
M3-AARC and the stochastic optimization model.
The profits obtained by these models for five test instances are shown in Table
A.7. As can be seen in the table, the stochastic optimization model gives a higher
profit than the rest of the models for all the five test instances. This is because the
stochastic optimization model is maximizing the expected profit, while the rest of
models are maximizing the worst-case profit.
3.3.8 Evaluation of the four-point approximation in Robust-
M3-AARC
We have mentioned above that we only consider four extreme points of the uncer-
tain parameters to represent the worst-case scenario. As the objective function is a
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quadratic function of uncertain parameters in Robust-M3-AARC, this approximation
may not be sufficient to represent the worst-case scenario. In this section, we examine
how good this approximation is through simulation.
We randomly generate a large number of sample points of (Dt, at) within the
uncertainty set. We use the pricing policy returned by Robust-M3-AARC to compute
the actual profit for each of the sample points we have generated. We compare the
actual profit against the worst-case profit obtained by Robust-M3-AARC. If the actual
profit is lower than the profit obtained by Robust-M3-AARC, we find a sample point
that leads to a lower objective value than that obtained by the four extreme points
we consider in the model. We compute the percentage of such sample points to see
how effective the four-point approximation is in representing the worst-case scenario.
In the simulation, we generated 10,000 sample points. The results obtained for all
the five test instances are shown in Table A.8.
As we can see from the table, the percentages of such sample points are zero for
testl.dat, test3.dat and test4.dat. For test2.dat and test5.dat, the percentages of
such sample points are only 2.5% and 0.015%, respectively. Based on these results,
we conclude that the four-point approximation is very effective in representing the
worst-case scenario in Robust-M3-AARC.
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Chapter 4
Uncertain data in a monopoly and
multi-period setting
One of the challenges faced in the multi-period extension of the pricing problem is
that the size of the problem grows exponentially with the number of periods. This
problem applies not only to the dynamic programming and stochastic optimization
models, but also to all the four robust optimization models we considered. In this
chapter, we examine how to address the computational issues in the multi-period
setting.
4.1 Dynamic programming model and stochastic
optimization model
As discussed before, dynamic programming suffers badly from the "curse of dimen-
sionality." This drawback makes dynamic programming inappropriate for solving
large-scale problems. In our pricing problem, we have to discretize not only the state
variable, but also the uncertain parameters in order to solve the problem at each
stage. For instance, even if we just discretize the state variable into 100 intervals and
the uncertain parameters into 10 intervals (this may not be big enough for an accurate
estimation), the computational complexity will become of the order of (100* 10 * 10)1
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for an n-period pricing problem. Clearly, the computational complexity explodes with
the number of periods.
We conduct an experiment to record the running time required to solve the dy-
namic programming model for different time periods. We start with two periods and
increase the number of time periods by 1 at each step. The results are shown in Table
A.9. We can see that the running time explodes with the increase of the time period.
From two periods to three periods, the running time increases by almost 200 times.
When the number of periods is four, it takes more than 30 minutes to complete. This
shows that although the dynamic programming model gives the best result, it is not
easy to extend to the multi-period setting.
Similarly, although stochastic optimization does not suffer from the curse of di-
mensionality in the state variables, it is usually limited to problems with very few
periods. When the number of periods increase, the running time explodes due to the
exponential explosion of the event tree.
In conclusion, neither the dynamic programming model nor the stochastic opti-
mization model extends easily to the multi-period setting.
4.2 Robust optimization models
The robust optimization modeling has been successfully applied to some large-scale
and highly complex optimization problems. In our problem, as the demand is a
linear function of the uncertain parameters, we identify that the value of uncertain
parameters that leads to the worst-case scenario can only happen at the extreme
points. As a result, the total number of constraints we need to consider for an n-
period pricing problem is of the order of 2' for the first three robust optimization
models and 4' for Robust-M3-AARC. In addition, as we only had access to the trial
version of AMPL, we are limited to solve a problem with at most 300 constraints.
However, for a eight-period pricing problem, the total number of constraints we have
is about 900 constraints for the first three robust models, and more than 200,000
constraints for Robust-M3-AARC.
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Thus, the main challenge faced in extending these models to a multi-period setting
is how to handle the potentially exponential number of constraints as the number of
periods grows. In particular, we have to first find a convenient way to generate the
large number of constraints. Second, we need to find strategies to solve the problem,
which is large-scale quadratic optimization problem with quadratic constraints, and
is even non-convex for Robust-M3-AARC.
4.2.1 Approaches
A constraint generator is written to generate all the extreme points and write them
to a file. This file can later be read by the main program to generate constraints as
needed.
For the first three robust models, we use delayed constraint generation to solve the
problems. By using this technique, we can solve a smaller problem at each time and
yet, still be able to guarantee the optimal solution. For Robust-M3-AARC , as the
formulation is not convex, we try two methods to solve the problem. The first method
is to try different initial points and choose the best solution among all the solutions
found as the optimal solution, assuming we have tried a substantially large number
of initial points. The second method is to transform the non-convex problem to a
convex problem with the MIP formulation, and then solve it with integer relaxation
and branch-and-bound techniques.
4.2.2 Delayed constraint generation for solving Robust-Mi
and Robust-M2
In the delayed constraint generation, we first choose a subset of the constraints that
will be considered in the problem. The selected set of constraints are called active
constraints and the set is called the active set, while the rest of the constraints are
called inactive constraints. The smaller version of the original problem is solved to
optimality and the obtained solution is then checked for feasibility among the inactive
constraints. Any of the inactive constraints that are violated is added back to the
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active set. The problem is then solved again for the new active set, and the obtained
solution is checked against all the inactive constraints. This procedure repeats until
a solution has been found to satisfy all the inactive constraints.
As the total number of constraints our solver can handle is limited to 300, we can
not allow the size of the active set to grow without control. To maintain the size of
the active set within a certain range, we remove any constraint which is not tight
from the active set once some new constraint is added to the set.
4.2.3 Approaches to solving Robust-M3-AARC
Robust-M3-AARC is a non-linear, non-convex optimization problem with a huge
number of constraints. A non-convex optimization problem cannot guaranteed to be
solved to global optimality. Nevertheless, it is possible to find a close enough local
optimum. To solve this non-convex problem, we tried two methods: the first method
is to try different initial subsets of constraints and solve each of them using delay
constraint generation individually; the best solution found among them is used as the
optimal solution. The second method is to use the MIP formulation to transform the
problem to a convex formulation, and solve it with integer relaxation and branch-
and-bound techniques.
In the first method, we consider various starting points and solve the problem to
optimality. A starting point refers to the active set in this case. It can be shown that
each active set gives a different optimal value. A random subset generation algorithm
is used to generate various starting points and identify the optimal solution from the
given pool.
In the second method, we considered the MIP formulation of the original model.
The new formulation is convex, if we relax the integrality constraints on the variable
K, and it can then be solved using AMPL. The solution obtained from this relaxed
problem will become an upper bound of the original problem. A branch-and-bound
technique is then applied to make each ui either 0 or 1 and find the optimal solution.
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4.3 Computational results
In this section, we show that the conclusions we have drawn about the effect of the
reference price, the budget of uncertainty, the delayed resource allocation, and the
feedback control in the previous chapter still apply in a multi-period setting.
We randomly generated three test instances and labeled them as test8-1.dat, test8-
2.dat and test8-3.dat, respectively.
The effect of the reference price
In this section, we compare the profits obtained by Robust-Mi and Robust-M2 for
the 8-period test instances. The results are shown in Table A.10. We can see from
the table that the profits obtained by Robust-M2 are higher than that of Robust-Mi
for all the test instances.
The effect of the budget of uncertainty
In this section, we choose test8-1.dat, for which the budget of uncertainty is 0.1 for
all the time periods, and increase the budget of uncertainty using a step of 0.1 to
generate another eight test instances. The profits obtained by Robust-Mi on these
nine test instances are shown in Figure B-12. Clearly, we see the profit obtained
decreases when the budget of uncertainty increases.
The effect of the delayed resource allocation and feedback control
In this section, we compare the profits obtained by Robust-Mi, Robust-M3 and
Robust-M3-AARC on test8-1.dat to see whether the delayed resource allocation leads
to a better pricing policy for most of the realizations of the uncertain parameters.
Similar to what we have done in the 2-period case, we randomly generate a large
set of sample points, where each of the sample points contains one set of realized
values for the parameters, and compare the profits obtained by these three models on
these sample points. The result is shown in Figure B-13. We can see from the figure
that although the worst-case profit obtained by Robust-Mi is higher than that of the
61
other two models, it has a lower profit for most of the sample points. This shows that
the delayed resource allocation has the strength of achieving higher profit even in a
multi-period setting.
To see the effect of feedback control, we compare the results obtained by Robust-
M3 and Robust-M3-AARC. We can see from Figure B-13 that the curve obtained by
Robust-M3-AARC is slightly above that of Robust-MI. In fact, for 38% of the total
sample points, Robust-M3 has a higher profit than Robust-M3-AARC.
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Chapter 5
Uncertain data in an oligopoly
setting
In this chapter, we consider the pricing problem in an oligopoly setting. We show
that a market equilibrium pricing policy exists for all of our models. An iterative
learning algorithm is studied for computing market equilibrium prices.
5.1 Existence of Nash equilibrium policy
Definition (Nash equilibrium policies). The pricing policies for each seller are
Nash equilibrium pricing policies if no single seller can increase her payoff by unilat-
erally changing her policy.
Theorem 1. If an integer solution n exists in the MIP best response formulations of
Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC, then there exists an equilibrium policy to these
two models
Proof. If an integer solution K exists in the MIP best response formulations of Robust-
M3 and Robust-M3-AARC, we can eliminate K from these two models. Thus, Robust-
M3 and Robust-M3-AARC become similar to Robust-Mi and Robust-M2 in the sense
that the feasible space is a non-empty, compact and convex set. As the objective
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function is continuous and concave, there exists an equilibrium policy to these two
models according to the Glicksburg-Fan-Debreu theorem (see [13]). El
Although a Nash equilibrium exists for all of our models, we may not be able
to compute the equilibrium pricing policy for all of them as easily. In fact, only
for Robust-Mi, where both the price and demand are decided at time zero, is the
equilibrium pricing policy computable, while for the rest of models, it may not. A
detailed discussion follows:
Case 1: In Robust-Mi, as the price and demand are decided at the start of the
first period, the profit of each seller can be determined at the beginning of the game.
In an oligopoly setting, the profit of each seller is only affected by the prices of her
competitors, but not other factors such as the actual realization of the uncertain
parameters. As in this robust model, the demand function is concave and continuous
in all arguments, the joint strategy set is closed, convex, bounded, a Nash equilibrium
can be computed easily(see [20]).
Case 2: For the rest of our formulations, either the price is determined at time
zero and the actual realization of uncertain parameters determines the demand, or
the decision for the prices are delayed until the realization of uncertain parameter at
early periods are known. In both cases, the actual realization of uncertain parameters
plays a crucial role in determining the profit that each seller can have. In other words,
in an oligopoly setting, each seller's profit is no longer only affected by her own prices,
but also by the actual realizations of the uncertain parameters in her model. In this
case, a convergence to the equilibrium pricing policy may not be easily computed.
One would need to compute an equilibrium pricing policy that is optimal for every
possible realization of uncertain parameters. For different realizations of the uncertain
parameters, the equilibrium pricing policy will change accordingly.
Although the equilibrium pricing policy may not be computable for some of our
models, it is still likely to be achieved under certain assumptions. These are discussed
in the following sections.
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5.2 Iterative learning algorithms
In this section, we use the iterative learning algorithm as introduced in [17] to compute
the market equilibrium prices. The basic idea for the algorithm is as follows. Consider
a market where none of the sellers is aware of the equilibrium policies for the current
round of the game. Each seller solves the best response problem by observing her
competitors' prices from the previous realization of the game and adopts a policy
that maximizes her payoff. No seller has information about the inventories of her
competitors except the prices realized in the previous round of the game. The entire
multi-period game is repeated for a number of times until the market approaches an
equilibrium state. We denote the best response problem seller i solves with respect
to her competitors' strategies from the kth round of game by BRi((p_,)k). The
equilibrium prices are denoted by p*. The iterative learning algorithm is formally
presented as follows:
Iterative Learning Algorithm:
1: for i E I do
2: (p 0 Pt
3: end for
4: for i E I do
5: (pi)1 <- BRi((p-i)o)
6: end for
7: k <- 1
8: while (p.)k = (pi)k-- do
9: for i E I do
10: (pi)k+1 <- BRi((p_i)k)
11: end for
12: k <- k +1
13: end while
14: p* +- (p)k
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15: RETURN p*
5.3 Implementation issues
We implement the iterative learning algorithm for both a two-period and a three-
period pricing problem. We use the dynamic programming model to solve the best
response problem at each iteration. However, as the dynamic programming model in
our pricing problem generates a look-up table of optimal prices for each discretized
inventory value, and the inventory is affected by the actual realization of the uncertain
parameters, we need to generate realized values for the uncertain parameters in the
simulation in order for each seller's competitors to observe her prices at the previous
iteration. This introduces a problem: if we randomly generate realized values for the
uncertain parameters, the pricing policy each seller adopts based on her look-up table
generated by the dynamic programming model will be random too. Therefore, each
seller's pricing policy is not only affected by her competitors's prices from the previous
iteration, but also by the realized values of the uncertain parameters at previous
iteration we have simulated. If the realized values of the uncertain parameters are
generated randomly, sellers' prices can hardly converge to a steady state. This implies
that the market equilibrium can never be reached using this algorithm.
In order to address this problem, we try to generate a large number of realized
values for the uncertain parameters, find the deterministic pricing policy for each of
them, and take the average of all the pricing policies as the policy that will be observed
by her competitors at the following iteration. When the number of realized values we
generated for the uncertain parameters at each iteration is very large, the resulting
pricing policy becomes less affected by the uncertain parameters, and therefore, the
market equilibrium may be computed. Our computational results (from Figure B-14
to FB-17) show that 10 realized values generated for the uncertain parameters at
each iteration are good enough to ensure the convergence of the iterative learning
algorithm.
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5.4 Computational results
First, we consider a duopoly market and study if the iterative learning algorithm
converges to an equilibrium pricing policy. We use test1.dat as the test instance in
this case. We tried different number of realized values generated for the uncertain
parameters at each iteration. Therefore, we can compare how the number of realized
values generated will affect the convergence of the prices. We also try four different
initial prices to see how sensitive the iterative learning algorithm is to the initial
prices chosen. We can see from Figure B-14 to Figure B-17 that the prices converge
when the number of realized values generated for the uncertain parameters is large.
Furthermore, for all the four initial prices, the equilibrium prices are around (1.7, 6.2)
for seller 1 and (2.7, 3.3) for seller 2. Note that even when the initial price we choose is
(7,8) for seller 1 and (4,7) for seller 2, which are both higher than the converged price
of these two sellers respectively, the iterative learning algorithm is able to compute
the equilibrium prices. This shows that the iterative learning algorithm is not very
sensitive to the choice of initial prices.
Next, we consider a market with three sellers. Similarly, we try a different number
of realized values generated for the uncertain parameters at each iteration. We try
four different initial prices to see how sensitive the iterative learning algorithm is
to the initial prices. We can see from Figure B-18 to Figure B-21 that the prices
converge when the number of realized values generated for the uncertain parameters
is 10. Furthermore, for all the four initial prices, the equilibrium prices are around
(1.6, 6.2) for seller 1, (2.4, 3.3) for seller 2 and (3.1, 3.1) for seller 3.
5.5 Convergence of the iterative learning algorithm
The reason that the iterative learning algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium
for Robust-Mi is that Robust-Mi fixes the demand to be the worst-case demand,
but not the demand decided by nature (i.e., the demand function with the actual
realization of uncertain parameters). As we can identify that the worst-case scenario
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can only happen at an extreme point, we, in fact, transform the robust demand
model to a deterministic demand model. In other words, we get rid of the side effect
of uncertainty on the profit in this model. Therefore, a Nash equilibrium exists and
is computable, as the uncertainty factor no longer affects the solution.
For the rest of the models, such as the dynamic programming formulation, the
iterative learning algorithm can still reach a Nash equilibrium policy if we take enough
actual realizations of uncertain parameters, and use the average of them to decide
the prices. This is, in fact, another way to minimize the effect of uncertainty on the
solution. Numerical results show that a Nash equilibrium can be computed if the
number of actual realizations of uncertain parameters is large enough (such as 10 sets
of realizations).
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Chapter 6
Conclusions
In this thesis, we formulated a multi-period pricing model for a monopoly and an
oligopoly market. Each seller has a fixed starting inventory, and the products are
perishable. The demand function faced by each seller is uncertain and is dependent
on all the sellers' prices at the current period and the past pricing history. Our
focus was to address two of the main issues in the pricing model: uncertainty and
competition.
To address the issue of uncertainty in demand, we first studied the pricing problem
in a monopoly setting. We used robust optimization, adaptable robust optimization,
dynamic programming and stochastic optimization to formulate various dynamic pric-
ing models, and find an adaptable closed pricing policy for each of these models. We
examined the effect of budget of uncertainty, reference price, delayed resource allo-
cation, and feedback control on the quality of the pricing policy. We later extended
the robust models to a multi-period setting and show that the results found in a
monopoly and two-period setting are still valid.
We addressed the issue of competition by studying if a market equilibrium exists in
our models. We also used an iterative learning algorithm to compute the equilibrium
prices. We showed through numerical results that the algorithm computes the market
equilibrium prices if we generate a significantly large number of realized values for
the uncertain parameters at each step of the iterative learning algorithm.
There are a number of interesting findings from this research, which are discussed
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as follows:
1. Through the comparison of Robust-Mi and Robust-M2, we found that the
consideration of the reference price in the demand function has a positive effect
on the quality of the resulting pricing policy. Thus, the presence of the reference
price not only makes the demand function a better model of customers' attitudes
towards purchasing, but also increases the overall profit that can be obtained.
2. For the same robust optimization model, an increase in the budget of uncer-
tainty will cause a decrease in the objective value. This is because a higher
budget of uncertainty corresponds to a bigger uncertainty set, which will make
the worst-case solution even worse. However, an increase in the budget of un-
certainty also causes a decrease in the probability of constraint violation, as the
protection level increases.
3. From the comparison of Robust-Mi with Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC, we
found that there are both advantages and disadvantages of the delayed resource
allocation adopted in Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC. The advantage of
the delayed resource allocation is to give models the flexibility to change their
policies with respect to the actual realization of uncertain parameters. As a
result, the objective values of Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC are higher
than that of Robust-Mi on average. However, the disadvantage is that it leads
to a lower objective value in the worst-case scenario, as the choices of prices are
more restricted in these two models in order to protect the resource capacity
constraint against all possible realization of uncertain parameters.
4. By comparing Robust-M3 with Robust-M3-AARC, we found that a closed-loop
policy outperforms an open-loop policy in general. The feedback control in
Robust-M3-AARC acts as a tuning effect that tries to tune the current decision
based on the uncertain parameters that have realized. However, this tuning
effect is just an estimation of what could happen in reality, and it does not
guarantee an increase in the objective value at all times.
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5. We compared the dynamic programming model with robust optimization mod-
els and found that the dynamic programming model performs better than robust
optimization models in general. However, when a feedback control is used in the
robust formulation, the results obtained by the dynamic programming model
and Robust-M3-AARC are very close. In fact, we have shown in Chapter 3
that Robust-M3-AARC even outperforms the dynamic programming model for
as high as 28% of the total sample points in our simulation. This is a very
promising result. It shows that a robust formulation with feedback control can
achieve almost as good results as a dynamic programming formulation. More-
over, Robust-M3-AARC is computationally tractable and, yet, produces good
results in a multi-period setting.
6. The stochastic optimization model gives a higher profit than that of robust
optimization models. Similar to the robust optimization model, the stochas-
tic optimization model also benefits from the pre-computation of the optimal
solution for each scenario.
7. In a multi-period setting, dynamic programming and stochastic optimization
lose to robust optimization, as they either suffer from the curse of dimensionality
in the state variable or the increase in the number of periods. In contrast, robust
optimization is able to solve the large-scale optimization problem. We used a
delayed constraint generation method to solve the robust optimization models
in the multi-period setting.
8. We studied a Nash equilibrium in an oligopoly setting. We showed the existence
of solution for both the best response subproblems and the market equilibrium
problem for all of our models. However, for all of our models except Robust-
M1, as the profit obtained by each of them is affected by the actual realization
of uncertain parameters, an equilibrium pricing policy may not be as easily
computable. We considered an iterative learning algorithm and made some
assumptions to minimize the effect of uncertainty on these models. We showed
using simulation how this algorithm computes a Nash equilibrium policy.
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Appendix A
Tables
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Table A.1: Effect of reference price: comparison of the profits obtained by Robust-Mi
and Robust-M2.
test1 test2 test3 test4 test5
Robust-Mi 109.37 7 107.48 137.603 109.37
Robust-M2 112.79 8.4426 116.18 152.83 112.79
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Table A.2: The profit obtained and the ratio of constraint violation for different
budget of uncertainty
test4 test6 test7 test8 test9 testlO test11 test12 test13
Profit 137.6 79.9 49.9 18 12.4 7.9 4.4 1.7 0.4
Ratio 45.0% 41.7% 36.8% 24.6% 23.1% 12.3% 11.1% 4.7% 3.9%
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Table A.3: The profits obtained by Robust-Mi, Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-ARRC
for different test instances.
test 1 test2 test3 test4 test5
Robust-Mi 109.37 7 107.48 137.603 109.375
Robust-M3 109.37 2 107.48 137.603 75
Robust-M3-ARRC 109.37 2 107.48 137.603 75
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Table A.4: The percentage of sample points for which Robust-Mi has a higher profit
than Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC respectively.
testi test2 test3 test4 test5
Robust-M3 0% 0.55% 0% 0% 13.21%
Robust-M3-AARC 0% 1.46% 0% 0% 13.21%
77
Table A.5: The percentage of sampling points for which Robust-M3 has a higher
profit than that of Robust-M3-AARC.
testi test2 test3 test4 test5
% of sampling points 21.1% 8.62% 14.49% 24.77% 0%
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Table A.6: The percentage of sample points for which Robust-M3-AARC has a higher
profit than that of the dynamic programming model.
test1 test2 test3 test4 test5
% of sampling points 19% 2% 13% 12% 28%
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Table A.7: The profits obtained by Robust-Mi, Robust-M3,
stochastic optimization model for different test instances.
Robust-M3-ARRC and
test 1 test2 test3 test4 test5
Robust-Mi 109.37 7 107.48 137.603 109.375
Robust-M3 109.37 2 107.48 137.603 75
Robust-M3-ARRC 109.37 2 107.48 137.603 75
Stochastic programming 182.759 197.64 131.226 177.35 182.75
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Table A.8: The percentage of sample points that lead to lower objective values than
that obtained by Robust-M3-AARC.
testi test2 test3 test4 test5
Percentage 0% 2.5% 0% 0% 0.015%
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Table A.9: The running time required by the dynamic programming model to solve
the pricing problem for various numbers of time periods.
Period CPU Time
2 1.26s
3 235.43s
4 >30min
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Table A. 10: Effect of the reference price: comparison of profits obtained by Robust-
MI and Robust-M2 on the eight-period test instances.
test8-1 test8-2 test8-3
Robust-Mi 654.29 439.23 275.36
Robust-M2 692.38 482.15 314.83
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Figure B-1: Effect of budget of uncertainty: The profits obtained and the probability
of constraint violation for different budget of uncertainty in a monopoly and two-
period setting.
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Figure B-2: Effect of delayed resource allocation: The profits obtained by Robust-Mi,
Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC for various realizations of uncertain parameters
on testl.dat in a monopoly and two-period setting.
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Figure B-3: Effect of delayed resource allocation: The profits obtained by Robust-Mi,
Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC for various realizations of uncertain parameters
on test2.dat in a monopoly and two-period setting.
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Figure B-4: Effect of delayed resource allocation: The profits obtained by Robust-Mi,
Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC for various realizations of uncertain parameters
on test3.dat in a monopoly and two-period setting.
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Figure B-5: Effect of delayed resource allocation: The profits obtained by Robust-Mi,
Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC for various realizations of uncertain parameters
on test4.dat in a monopoly and two-period setting.
90
0
0
140
0
Co prsn oPrftof Mdl1 Mode 3Wt CaeadModel 1 Ref
Comparison of Profits of Model 1, Model 3(Worst Case), and Model 1 Ref
240
Robust-Mi
220 Robust-M3
Robust-M3-AARC
200
180
2 160
* 140
120
100
80-
601
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
Sample Point (D,alpha)
Figure B-6: Effect of delayed resource allocation: The profits obtained by Robust-Mi,
Robust-M3 and Robust-M3-AARC for various realizations of uncertain parameters
on test5.dat in a monopoly and two-period setting.
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Figure B-7: Comparison of the profits obtained by Robust-Mi, Robust-M3-AARC
and dynamic programming model for various realizations of uncertain parameters on
testl.dat in a monopoly and two-period setting.
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Figure B-8: Comparison of the profits obtained by Robust-Mi, Robust-M3-AARC
and dynamic programming model for various realizations of uncertain parameters on
test2.dat in a monopoly and two-period setting.
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Figure B-9: Comparison of the profits obtained by Robust-Mi, Robust-M3-AARC
and dynamic programming model for various realizations of uncertain parameters on
test3.dat in a monopoly and two-period setting.
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Figure B-10: Comparison of the profits obtained by Robust-Mi, Robust-M3-AARC
and dynamic programming model for various realizations of uncertain parameters on
test4.dat in a monopoly and two-period setting.
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Figure B-11: Comparison of the profits obtained by Robust-Mi, Robust-M3-AARC
and dynamic programming model for various realizations of uncertain parameters on
test5.dat in a monopoly and two-period setting.
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Figure B-12: Comparison of the profits obtained by Robust-Mi by varying the budget
of uncertainty on test8-1.dat in a monopoly and eight-period setting.
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Robust-M3-AARC on test8-1.dat in a monopoly and eight-period setting.
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Figure B-16: The pricing policies of two sellers at different iterations of the iterative
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different numbers of sets of realized values are generated for the uncertain parameters.
101
6
5
- Player 1, list Period
-- Player 1, 2nd Period
-- Player 2, 1 st Period
-- Player 2, 2nd Period
-i
0
2.510 3
2.5 311-510
The Pricing Policy of Seller 1 and 2 over Iterations8 1
Player 1, 1st Period
Player 1, 2nd Period
7 .
- - Player 2, 1st Period
.Player 2, 2nd Period
6 -
5
4-
3-
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Iteration
(a) 2 sets of realized values generated
The Pricing Policy of Seller 1 and 2 over Iterations
Player 1, 1st Period
Player 1, 2nd Period
Player 2, 1st Period
.Player 2, 2nd Period
K-
1 1.5 2 2.5
Iteration
8
7
6
5
4
2
5 10 15 20 25 30
Iteration
35
(b) 3 sets of realized values generated
The Pricing Policy of Seller 1 and 2 over Iterations
7
6
5
4
3
2
3 3.5 4
Player 1, 10t Period
Player 1, 2nd Period
- Player 2, 1st Period
Player 2, 2nd Period
1 1.5 2 2.5
Iteration
(c) 5 sets of realized values generated (d) 10 sets of realized values generated
Figure B-17: The pricing policies of two sellers at different iterations of the iterative
learning process. The initial price is (7,8) for seller 1 and (4,7) for seller 2, and a
different number of sets of realized values are generated for the uncertain parameters.
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Figure B-18: The pricing policies of three sellers at different iterations of the iterative
learning process. The initial price is (0,0) for all the sellers, and a different number
of sets of realized values are generated for the uncertain parameters.
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Figure B-19: The pricing policies of three sellers at different iterations of the iterative
learning process. The initial price is (2,5) for seller 1, (2,2) for seller 2 and (3,3)
for seller 3, and a different number of sets of realized values are generated for the
uncertain parameters.
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Figure B-20: The pricing policies of three sellers at different iterations of the iterative
learning process. The initial price is (2,3) for seller 1, (1,2) for seller 2 and (2,2)
for seller 3, and a different number of sets of realized values are generated for the
uncertain parameters.
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Figure B-21: The pricing policies of three sellers at different iterations of the iterative
learning process. The initial price is (7,8) for seller 1, (4,7) for seller 2 and (6,6)
for seller 3, and a different number of sets of realized values are generated for the
uncertain parameters.
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